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Strategic Insights: Caribbean Security Issues
May 16, 2017 | Dr. R. Evan Ellis
INTRODUCTION
Outside of military, law enforcement, and some academic circles, security issues are rarely
part of the discourse about the Caribbean. Yet, during the Cold War, the region’s contiguity with
the United States made its largest island, Cuba, the focal point of the world’s closest publicly
known approximation to nuclear war.
Today, the Caribbean is at peace and continues to be a strategically important region to the
United States and its geopolitical rivals, transnational criminal organizations, and those who live
there. Currently, the security environment of the Caribbean is subject to multiple interacting
stresses, influences, and potentially transformative events posing significant consequences for the
United States and the region.
REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The security environment of the Caribbean is defined by a particularly unique combination of
characteristics. The region’s proximity to the United States shapes it as a market for illicit, as well
as licit flows, including the movement of commercial goods, drugs, and migrants to the United
States, and money and tourists from it. In this way, the United States is thus both a principal driver
of the region’s security challenges, as well as its principal source of trade, investment, and other
resources to fight those challenges.
Despite attempts at integration, the region is also defined by fragmentation, only partly
surmounted through organizations such as Caricom and the Organization of East Caribbean States.
The region’s small governments, with limited resources and fragile institutions, make it susceptible
to both the corrupting influences of transnational criminal organizations, and the initiatives of
larger states with an interest in its affairs, including the United States, China, and Russia, among
others.
ENDURING REGIONAL SECURITY THEMES
Even without geopolitical considerations, the security environment of the region is shaped by
three persistent, interdependent, albeit evolving, challenges: climate, migration, and criminal
flows. It is these challenges that are the focus of the policy documents, doctrine, day-to-day
activities, and budgets of the region’s security forces.
The principal islands of the region lie in the paths of hurricanes and tropical storms that most
typically form to the east of the region during the June 1-November 30 Atlantic hurricane season
and move westward. The regular devastation of Caribbean islands by such storms continue to make
national emergency response systems, military support for civil authorities in disaster relief efforts,

international coordination, and international relief efforts key components of the security
discourse.
As another facet of climate, the tropical geography of the Caribbean makes contagious diseases
a serious public health danger. At the same time, the region’s dependence on tourism makes
disease a strategic economic risk as well. Nonetheless, the hazard is primarily concentrated in the
region’s poorest countries, including Haiti, with the perceived risk of transmission influencing the
attitudes of neighboring states toward immigration.
Trans-Regional criminal flows, and their linkage to and impact on local populations, are
arguably the greatest source of violence and threat to governance in the Caribbean. The dynamic
is driven by the location of the region between the hemisphere’s largest market for drugs and
people, the United States; and South America, its largest source of both.
With respect to drugs, the deterioration of governance in Venezuela has complimented efforts
by transport groups and overland drug routes in Central America to increase narcotics shipments
from Western Venezuelan states, such as Zulia, San Cristobal, and Apure (as well as the north
coast of Colombia), to Hispaniola (among other routes), bringing with it money for bribes, as well
as lucrative opportunities for criminal activities, which tempt young, underemployed Caribbean
populations. Such drug flows also bring criminal cartels from both Mexico and Colombia, which
involve local groups in their activities, spawning violence both by generating competition for drug
routes, and by encouraging local drug cultures.
With respect to money, the region is home to some of the world’s most notorious tax shelter
nations, such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. The search for protection from
financial accountability attracts significant illicit, as well as licit, financial flows from an
increasingly globalized economy to small economies and weakly institutionalized governments
transformed by such resources.
With respect to people, the Caribbean is a channel for human trafficking and smuggling for
multiple groups moving persons toward the United States, including Chinese triads (organized
crime), as well as migration to the United States from the region itself.
To a degree, previous patterns of migration have also created natural criminal links between
local groups and the United States. Examples include the previous Jamaica-based organization
known as the Shower Posse, which leveraged the Jamaican diaspora in Miami and the greater New
York area to export cocaine to the U.S. market. Similarly, the diaspora of people from the
Dominican Republic in the United States has contributed to a significant role of Dominican gangs
in the smuggling of drugs to the U.S. East Coast and their distribution.
In Jamaica, the role of English as the national language further facilitated the growth of the
“lottery scam,” often overlooked in discussions of the regional security environment. The scam
used Jamaica-based telemarketing operators to rob billions of dollars from foreigners, mostly in
the United States, flooding the island with illicit money.
In all cases, the inflows of illicitly gained resources have empowered local gangs and
smuggling groups, expanding corruption and violence in the countries involved, and transforming
groups of delinquents (once exploited by local political machines) into powerful criminal entities
that hijack the nation’s politics.
SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
Compounding the fragility of the region’s strategic environment and the persistence of a
number of serious security challenges, the Caribbean currently faces multiple, potentially
transformative influences and events.

The discovery of significant oil deposits in the Stabroek block off the coast of Guyana is likely
to significantly expand the resources of the Guyanese state. In 2015, Guyana experienced a sea
change in political dominance from the indo-Guyanese, who had ruled the country since 1992, to
the Afro-Guyanese, whose first government was headed by former Guyana Defense Forces
Brigadier David Granger. Such opportunity in Guyana, however, will likely bring with it a
significant increase in foreign activity in the once isolated country, as well as significant potential
for corruption and the possible rekindling of border disputes with neighbors, such as that which
re-emerged in 2015 between Guyana and neighboring Venezuela over the Essequibo region.
The future of Cuba will also dynamically affect the region. With Republicans controlling both
houses of the U.S. Congress and with U.S. President Donald Trump currently adopting a hardline
posture toward the island, the Cuban government could abandon some of the restraint it has shown
in recent years. It is very possible that in the face of American belligerence that Cuba could become
more receptive to the advances of U.S. adversaries, like Russia and China, in the security realm,
to include the possible granting of base access to the militaries of those countries, and to allow
access to Cuban signals intelligence facilities, such as Lourdes and Bejucal. In the process, Cuba
could return to its historic role as regional leader of anti-U.S. leftism, taking up the mantle from
Venezuela in continuing chaos. In the context of the death of Fidel Castro in 2016, the upcoming
7th Congress of the Cuban communist party in 2018 raises the possibility for a range of significant
political changes: from a turn toward more democratic governance and reintegration into the
economic and political structures of the Caribbean, making the island a competitor for tourism and
a leader in regional business; to political and economic chaos, spawning significant migratory
flows impacting the economies, social support systems, and politics of the region. Arguably, with
a move toward either greater integration with the region, or toward chaos, Cuba is positioned to
become more important as a center of regional organized crime flows.
In Haiti, the nation’s sub-development and inadequate infrastructure makes its population
particularly vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters like the 2004 earthquake and 2016
hurricane that devastated the island, as well as diseases such as cholera. With the pull-out of the
United Nations mission MINUSTAH at the end of 2017, the nation could descend more deeply
into criminality and disorder, expanding its role as a refuge for criminals, a transit node for illegal
flows, and a source of outward immigration, affecting even more adversely its neighbors in the
region, and becoming a greater problem for the Dominican Republic, with which it shares
Hispaniola.
On the southern border of the Caribbean basin, the ongoing collapse of Venezuela fuels a
growing wave of refugees and criminality that is also adversely impacting its Caribbean and South
American neighbors. In addition to the previously mentioned drug flows into the Caribbean from
Venezuela’s interior, the economic desperation and breakdown of law enforcement has fueled the
rebirth of piracy on the nation’s Caribbean coast, and a new illicit trade in goods and refugees
across the seven miles of water that separates Venezuela from Trinidad. Venezuela’s disintegration
has similarly driven flows of goods and refugees to Aruba and Curacao, off its northwestern coast,
and next door, to Colombia’s Caribbean coast.
Beyond expanding such criminal activities and migration, the deterioration of Venezuela will
further prejudice the Caribbean by effectively ending the remaining flows of subsidized oil to the
region under the Petrocaribe program, which subsidizes the energy sector of many countries of the
region.

It is also not clear how the destabilization of Venezuela and the outward flow of refugees will
affect radical Islamic actors in Venezuela and their relationship with likeminded groups elsewhere
in the Caribbean, such as the Jamaat al Muslimeen in Trinidad and Tobago.
Finally, as already occurred in 2015, it is possible that the destabilization of Venezuela, in
combination with new offshore oil claims, in places like Guyana, may tempt the nation to launch
a military conflict against neighboring Colombia or Guyana, further destabilizing the Caribbean
basin.
Beyond such possibilities, the security environment in the Caribbean will be impacted by the
initiatives of Russia, China, Iran, and the United States as they react to opportunities and events in
the region and to each other.
For its part, the United States will impact the security region through its immigration and other
homeland security policies, as well as through possible changes to security and economic
assistance programs, such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, or to trade accords such as
CAFTA-DR. Changes to immigration policies such as the elimination of the “wet foot-dry foot”
policy toward Cuba have already had ripple effects on immigration flows throughout the Caribbean
basin.
With respect to Islamic groups, the region contains multiple important communities, including
those in Guyana, Suriname, the Caribbean coast of Colombia (Barranquilla and Maicao), and
Trinidad and Tobago—country of origin of the largest per capita outflow of foreign fighters to Iraq
and Syria, with over 125 believed to have left the island nation to fight for the Islamic State. In
terms of Iran, in 2016, its President Hassan Rouhani made the Caribbean the focus of the first trip
to the region, with stops in Margarita Island, Venezuela, for the summit of Non-Aligned Nations,
as well as in Cuba. It is possible that the Iranian regime, with $150 billion in new capital from the
lifting of economic sanctions and incensed by confrontational policies from the Trump
administration, might expand its presence in the Caribbean basin.
With respect to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), expanding loans and equity investments
by Chinese companies in Caribbean nations such Jamaica, the Bahamas, Dominica, Barbados,
Guyana, and Suriname, will give the PRC increasing leverage in the region on critical issues. Such
leverage will be reinforced by ongoing training of the region’s military officers in PRC institutions
and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military diplomacy that has focused notably on the region.
Examples include the 2011 and 2015 visits to the region by the PLA hospital ship Peace Arc, the
2015 visit to Cuba by the PLA 20th Naval Task Force, the deployment of PLA military police to
Haiti from 2004 to 2012, and Chinese gifts of equipment to the region’s armed forces.
At the same time, a possible breakdown of the diplomatic truce between the PRC and Taiwan
would also have transformative effects on the region’s security environment, possibly bringing an
influx of new loans and PRC political engagement, not only with the six Caribbean nations that
currently recognize Taiwan, but also with the Central American states that bound the Caribbean to
the West: Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize.
A return to diplomatic recognition of the PRC by Nicaragua could be particularly impactful,
insofar as it could motivate the Chinese government to formally back the long-delayed Nicaragua
Canal Project, transforming shipping flows and commercial patterns throughout the Caribbean.
The new canal, in turn, would likely unleash a new wave of competition for infrastructure projects
throughout the region, including port projects such as that proposed in Goat Island, Jamaica, as
key countries in the region seek to position themselves as logistics hubs to accommodate
expanding traffic, including larger ships passing through the canal, in turn generating changes in
the patterns of both licit and illicit commerce.

With respect to Russia, deepening disillusionment in Cuba or the consolidation of power by
supporters of the Fidel Castro line, following the 2018 Congress, could lead the nation’s leadership
to expand security or other engagements with their former Cold War ally. Worsening U.S. relations
with Central America could similarly embolden Russian security engagement with Nicaragua.
Such engagement, in the context of the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, could precipitate an
expanded Russian presence in the Caribbean (including the Nicaraguan waters around the
Colombian island of San Andres) in fulfillment of Russian commitments to provide security for
the canal.
CONCLUSION
The strategic importance of the Caribbean to the United States, combined with the potential
for dramatic change in its security environment, makes it imperative for the United States to closely
monitor developments in the region, and for the United States to maintain engagement with the
region in the security as well as economic domains.
Such engagement should include:
1. Continuing to work closely with the region on matters of disaster relief;
2. Using incentives and trade agreements to encourage trade with and investment
in the region;
3. Expanding, not cutting, programs to strengthen the Caribbean’s institutions,
with an emphasis on fighting corruption and negotiating the best possible deals
with (rather than excluding) economic engagement by partners such as China;
4. Tailoring any changes to U.S. immigration or port security policies to minimize
the effects on the region;
5. Sending strong signals regarding engagement with Iran, Russia, and China in the
security domain;
6. Expanding intelligence and security cooperation against criminal and terrorist
groups in the region, to include radical Islamic actors; and,
7. Preparing to support and participate in a multilateral response to the
disintegration of Venezuela or other high-impact events affecting the region.
The Caribbean basin is connected to the United States in geographic, economic, and human
terms. Its prosperity and security directly impacts that of the United States. Accordingly, the
choices that the United States makes with regard to furthering the region’s security and prosperity
will be felt in the United States as well.
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